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'Faction fights' and urban disturbances have been an almost permanent
feature of southern and central African ghetto life since the late 19th
century, yet with few exceptions they have never been subjected to detailed
scrutiny. The fact that they have been dismissed by a historian as 'brutal
inter-tribal riots' (1), or simply ignored by anthropologists and
sociologists is clearly far from satisfactory. If 'faction fights' were
and are so blatantly 'tribal', why have the anthropologists not looked at
them? Alternatively, if the fights are better interpreted as particular
manifestations of 'crowd behaviour1 and class conflict, sociologists and
historians working in southern African studies have been painfully slow to
draw inspiration from the imaginative European studies of scholars like
Eric Hobsbawm and George Rude1. (2) Although East Africa can at least boast
Frank Furedi's work on the crowd in Nairobi (3), the position elsewhere is
rather more bleak. As far as South Africa is concerned, only contributions
by Eddie Webster (4) and by Dudley Horner and Alide Kooy (5) relieve an
otherwise barren historiographical landscape, while for Southern Rhodesia
the silence is absolute. This is particularly unfortunate because what
this silence masks is a form of disturbance which erupted with sufficient
frequency and intensity in the urban locations, and especially the mine
compounds of Southern Rhodesia, to warrant its inclusion alongside
desertion and strike action as an important index of working class frus-
tration and despair.
In Bulawayo itself, 'faction fights' had occurred at least since the turn of
the century; Christmas Day 1900 witnessed an attack by 250 Ndebele on a
'Zambesi' (6) encampment near the town, apparently as revenge for the
murder of a Xhosa and an Ndebele by the northerners. (7) After the Boer
War, there was 'trouble' between the Xhosa and the Ndebele, again a few
years later between Ndebele and 'Zambesi Natives', and by 1930 'native dis-
turbances' had become a familiar part of Bulawayo1s Christmas and New Year
holidays for some years past. (8)
Such 'tribal' violence was even more common in the colony's scattered
mining compounds, an early example of which concerned a clash in December
1901 between Shangaan and 'Zambesi1 workers on the Tebekwe Mine. An
estimated 4-500 men were involved, most of whom were armed with sticks,
although some did have assegais and axes. The fight, for which no reason
was reported, was stopped by police action before any serious injuries were
inflicted. (9) A fight in the Nellie Mine compound on Christmas Day 1907
which resulted in two people killed and 15 injured, obliged the police to
mount a special patrol the following year to prevent any recrudescence of
the violence. (10) Fights of this nature were sometimes coupled with strike
action to achieve the ends of dissidents; in July 1919 a fight at Gaths Mine
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between local Kalanga workers and 'Nyasas1 had as its sequel a strike of
Kalanga labourers demanding the discharge of all Nyasas. Only when the
manager dismissed eight Nyasas, against whom even the Compound Inspector
thought the Kalanga had 'just grievances', did the strike end. (11) More
typical was a 'serious disturbance' at the Fred Mine in May 1920, where
white employees who 'fired shots over native heads', nonetheless succeeded
in severely wounding one black worker. (12)
Normally, though, 'tribal fights' were deemed to merit only brief and
laconic reports by state officials. 'On the day of my arrival', diffidently
noted by a Compound Inspector of the Shabani Mine, a fight 'started through
an Awemba woman insulting an Atonga, and several small arguments resulted
in 8 natives being removed to the Shabani hospital1. (13) As early as 1915
a fight was thought be be small when only one worker lost his life, (14)
and it was in this spirit that three months later the Chief Native
Commissioner decided that faction fights were 'not of sufficient importance
to warrant special legislation1. (15) Even the huge fight which shook
Wankie Colliery compound on Boxing Day 1926 drew relatively little
attention and received only a few paragraphs in official reports. On the
one side were H a ('Ma shuku lumbwe1) and 'Zambesi boys' (in this instance,
probably Tonga); on the other were Bemba and Ngoni. Approximately 1000
men were ranged on each side, armed with assegais, bows and arrows, sticks
and stones. 'The trouble apparently arose', explained the local Native
Commissioner, 'through a native of the Gokwe district, who was dancing with
the Mashukulumbwes and Zambesis, entering the dancing square of the
Angonis and Awembas and spearing their drum and stabbing a native in the
fleshy part of the neck'. The fight, which started at 3.30 p.m., raged for
three hours before it was eventually brought to an end by the Compound
Manager, his compound police, and the British South Africa Police. During
the uproar, two African workers were killed, 94 were wounded and 46 com-
pound huts were set on fire and destroyed. (16) No other details were
reported by either the Native Commissioner or the Compound Inspector, both
of whom seemed satisfied that the immediate provocation was sufficient
explanation for the fight, especially as 'all the natives were perfectly
sober and it is understood that the fight was not premeditated' . (17) And
in any case, as the Compound Inspector reminded his superiors, 'the feud
between these two tribes is an oldstanding one'. (18)
So long as 'tribal conflict' did not jeopardise production and was confined
to mine compounds, even when on a scale large enough actually to take or
threaten a substantial number of lives and property, sustained state interest
and action was conspicuously lacking. It was only when the violence which
engulfed the Bulawayo Location and railway compounds - the working class
ghettos of the colony's biggest town - promised to be uncontrollable, at the
very least to seriously inconvenience the town's white residents, and if
successful to disrupt the pattern of labour mobilization and control through-
out Matabeleland, that the state was moved to mount a somewhat more thorough-
going attack against, and investigation of, what the local newspaper head-
lined in inch-block capitals as 'Knobkerrie Warfare in Bulawayo'. (19)
As 1929 drew to a close, there was little to indicate that the pattern of
end of year events in Bulawayo would differ greatly from previous years.
Because 'minor native disturbances' had become a regular feature of the Christ-
mas holiday period, the C.I.D. and Police took the 'usual precautions' of
seizing a large number of weapons and of destroying a quantity of illegally
brewed beer.
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But such precautions notwithstanding, on the 24th, 25th and 26th December * small
native faction fights' took place in the Location and the streets of Bulawayo
itself. In both places, combatants were either dispersed or arrested by the
police. Up to this point, explained a subsequent official report, there was
nothing to show that anything unusual 'was in the course of preparation or
intended by the natives'. (20)
The next morning, Friday, 27th December, the Bulawayo Superintendent of Natives,
Col. C.L. Carbutt, was visited by deputations of Ndebele who 'showed consider-
able apprehension'. They alleged that 'the Mashona natives were out of hand,
and were going about in bands, assaulting any Matabele native who they found
alone, and that a number of Matabele had already been the victims of serious
assaults'. Later that day the same complainants returned to inform Carbutt
that the Shona 'were organising a general attack on the Location about 5 p.m.'.
As a result of this information, Carbutt contacted the Chief Superintendent
of the C.I.D. and the Superintendents of the Town and District police and
arranged to meet them, with whatever men they had available, at the Location
by 4.30 p.m. After this point, the pattern of events during 27th December
becomes confused. According to Carbutt, nothing happened on the afternoon
of the 27th and it was only that night that the fighting really developed:
'on our meeting at the Location nothing occurred. The Police however agreed
to keep a patrol in the Location during the night. The strength of this
patrol was unfortunately inadequate to deal effectively with the numerous
fights and disturbances which occurred during the night of 27th - 28th December.1 (21)
This is in sharp contrast to newspaper reports which, although couched in
sensational terms, seem too detailed to be pure invention. The Bulawayo
Chronicle (22) claimed that the first indications of trouble came at about
3.15 on the afternoon of the 27th, when white residents in Lobengula Street
near the Location complained to the police that 'a large and noisy crowd of
natives had collected'. The crowd was promptly and easily dispersed by
mounted police armed with flong and heavy batons', but shortly afterwards
'the situation took a serious turn when a force of
between 300 and 400 natives was seen marching across
the veld from the railway location in the direction of
the Bulawayo Location shouting and waving sticks, and
generally behaving in an extremely bellicose manner*.
Just as this 'formidable force1 was nearing Forestvale Road close to the
Location, where ' a crowd of about 1,000 Bulawayo Location natives had gathered out-
side their huts to await the attack*, so the mounted police force galloped
down the road, and 'lined up between the attacking natives and the Bulawayo
location'. The police then charged into the 'approaching mob1 and succeeded
in breaking up the crowd, while 'disarming many of the natives and arresting
large numbers'. Many of the attackers, however, were not so easily discouraged
and 'shouting and screaming threats, ran off and hid in surrounding bushes
and dongas', from where they 'tried again and again to break through to the
location'. For the rest of the afternoon, police patrols, comprising almost
all of the townfs strength, were obliged to repel persistent attempts to
attack the Location, It was only with the approach of nightfall that the
attempts gradually ceased 'and it seemed as though the trouble was all over'.
The quiet soon proved deceptive and was shattered at roughly 8 p.m. when police
headquarters learned that a railway compound was being burned down. With the
exception of a few troopers left on guard in the Location all available police
were rushed to Raylton, even as 'a rosy glow of flame in the southern sky
lent colour to the report'. fAs the railway compound was neared', reported
the Chronicle,
'a tremendous noise of shouting and screaming could be
heard and flames were seen everywhere. On arriving at the
location, it was found that all the clothing, bicycles and
other belongings of some 300 or 400 Manicaland natives living
in the location had been seized by Matabele, placed in nine or
ten huge piles and set alight. In the light of the raging
fires, natives could be seen dancing round, shouting warcries
and threats and waving sticks, knobkerries and knives, inciting
each other on to kill the Mashonas. The police surrounded the
compound, but did not venture inside, the savage spectacle of
the jumping, screaming, shouting natives continuing until the
fires had burned down'.
While the police ineffectually contemplated the 'savage spectacle' in front
of them, fighting once more flared up in the Bulawayo Location. The with-
drawal of most of the police to Raylton had 'enabled the natives who had
been dispersed earlier in the day to re-form', and just before 10 p.m. 'about
300 well-armed natives ... gained ingress to the Bulawayo Location and
were careering through the compound demolishing huts and attacking the Mashona'.
There was 'a tremendous din1, as the attackers 'joined in the location by
their tribesmen', rushed through the narrow streets ... fighting, screaming
and demolishing huts', and it was at this stage that most of the casualties
occurred, including one fatality. A scene of 'absolute confusion' greeted
the police who had hastily returned from Raylton 'in motor cars, riding motor
cycles, and on foot'. As before, numerous arrests were made, many people
were disarmed and the attackers dispersed 'into the open veld1. Once again,
though, repeated attempts were made to renew the attack: ' A party of police
would hear an alarm from a distant part of the location and on immediately
rushing to the spot would be just in time to see a body of men disappearing
into the bush after having destroyed one or more huts'. These hit-and-run
raids continued until midnight, with another major attack rumoured for 2 a.m.
Only when the attack failed to materialise, did some of the police stand
down, leaving strong patrols on guard for the remainder of the night.
The following day, Saturday, 28th December, Carbutt was again visited by
'further delegations of Matabele natives ... seeking protection1. (23)
After listening to them and, later ascertaining what he thought to be the
quite inadequate numbers the local police could spare for duty in the
location 'and other disturbed areas', a thoroughly alarmed Carbutt telephoned
Salisbury to request permission to have the white Citizen Defence Force
mobilised. Convinced that there would be 'a very serious and widespread
fracas during the night, unless we had adequate forces to control the natives',
Carbutt decided not to wait while Salisbury pondered its decision. Because
it was a Saturday morning, all mobilisation arrangements for the Defence
Force had to be made before its members stopped work at mid-day 'and scattered
for the weekend holiday1, so when Salisbury still had not replied by 11.45 a.m.,
Carbutt contacted Major Newman, commander of the Defence Force. Newman once
the position had been explained to him, immediately issued orders to members
of the Defence Force employed in the railway workshops to attend a parade
at 2 o'clock that afternoon. Authorization for this decision was received
from Salisbury soon after 1 p.m. (24)
These arrangements made, Carbutt went to the railway compound where there had
been a major disturbance the previous night, and warned 'large gatherings
of natives' that further rioting would not be tolerated and that they should
'remain quietly in their compounds and not join in any fracas which might
occur elsewhere1- (25) At this point, Carbutt was particularly concerned
to minimise and localise as far as possible the fights which occurred
persistently throughout the day. Unlike the large scale clashes of
Friday night, Saturday's pattern was mostly one of small, sporadic
incidents. It was reported that during the day 'fights took place between
small mobs of natives, and the charge office officials were continually
answering the telephone to alarmed householders asking for police to come
and disperse natives who had gathered in the streets and on pavements or
who were fighting'. (26) Reports that 'Manicas in large numbers were
fighting near the brickfields on the Khami Road1 proved exaggerated, (27)
and more typical was the attack on a single Shona worker near the railway
compounds. The worker, one Mangesi, was surrounded by a group of ten
Lozi labourers who seized his registration certificate, and putting it to
an unintended use, shouted 'Yes, he is a Maswina. Hit him. Hit him1.
Mangesi managed to break away from his captors but only got as far as the
edge of No. 4 compound near the Loco workshops before he was knocked
unconscious and 'assaulted in a very brutal manner'. (28)
As this example indicates, whatever the fights lacked in scale, they made
up in their intensity. Africans who had been attacked 'were in many cases
shockingly injured. One native, who could hardly stand ... (had) a
tremendous gash on the side of his head, where he had apparently been
bludgeoned with a knobkerrie. Blood was pouring from the wound and his
shirt was simply soaking. His mouth was also badly damaged'. (29)
Saturday also yielded an impressive array of confiscated weapons. A
slightly incredulous reporter listed 'no less than 50 different weapons'
collected in one police lorry. Among them were
'butchers knives, bicycle chains attached to
wooden handles, pumps, pieces of lead, and
knobkerries ... there were also a considerable
number of most business-like looking assegais.
Most of these were the real thing, although
many had been improvised by tying a knife or
razor at the end of a long stick. These weapons
could be used like flails and were capable of
causing shocking damage1. (30)
It was against this background that Carbutt addressed a major meeting in
the Bulawayo Location at 3 p.m. The meeting, attended by over 1000 blacks,
also enjoyed the presence of the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D.,
Major Brundel his second in command, and the commanders of the town and
district police. Carbutt, speaking through an interpreter, asked the
crowd to explain 'the cause of the disturbances', while stressing that
'all tribes of natives are equal in the eyes of the Government, and have
a right to pursue peaceful avocations anywhere within the Colony1. His
threat that 'a continuation of the disturbances would lead to the necessity
of very strong measures being taken to suppress them', received graphic
reinforcement from almost 100 uniformed and armed 'territorials' who
marched past the meeting on their way along several location streets, but
was nonetheless ignored. (31) Within minutes of the troops passing, as
the meeting dispersed, a shout 'was raised on the outskirts of the meeting1:
"There are the Manyikas (a term used to describe all Shona) looking for us",
The shout caused 'a general stampede, the Manyika natives being chased in
every direction and mobbed by overwhelming numbers of Matabele'. When
caught, they were clubbed to the ground and beaten, until their assailants
were driven off by the police. (32)
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Leaving the police to cope as best they could, Carbutt left the location to
investigate a murder which had allegedly been committed in the nearby municipal
quarries during the meeting. Although the rumour turned out to be false, he
did discover 'large numbers of natives armed with assegais ... and other
weapons advancing through the bush on to the Location, evidently bent on taking
part in the fighting they thought was going on there'. Assisted by two
Native Messengers, Carbutt disarmed as many as he 'could catch', and a little
later also 'rescued another foreign native, who was being mobbed in the house
of a Coloured man on the outskirts of the Location'. (33) On his return to
the Location, Carbutt found it 'still in a state of turmoil, natives rushing
about and shouting in every direction'. The situation was now 'rapidly be-
coming out of hand1 as the number of police was far too small to deal with
it. He concluded that 'unless order was restored a general fight on a large
scale would probably develop', especially as 'a concerted attack on the
Location might be expected during the night, from Mashonas who were assembling
to the north of the Location'. (34)
After some discussion with the town magistrate and police and Defence Force
officers, Carbutt's assessment of the situation was confirmed. Extra police
for the location were made available by substituting special constables (white
reservists) for regular policemen from the town station, the Defence Force
was placed on picket duty inside the Location and at various points between
it and the railway compounds, and instructions were issued to prevent move-
ment between the two compounds. These measures succeeded in containing all
but minor disturbances during the night, and with the arrival on Sunday
morning of police and Askari reinforcements from Salisbury, it proved possible
to withdraw the Defence Force, leaving the additional police to maintain order
'except for isolated fights which it is impossible for them to control over
the wide area of the Township and Commonage'. (35)
An uneasy calm was thus restored to the Location and the railway compounds
over the next few days. Exceptions such as occasional 'outbursts of fighting
in backyards and in sanitary lanes' were speedily stopped either by ordinary
police patrols or by the special 'raiding lorries' used by the police to
break up any crowds they came across. (36) A Chronicle reporter who visited
the Location on Sunday evening found 'everything was as quiet as could be
expected. The Location was very thoroughly picketed and there was a reserve
of mounted and foot police at the Location Superintendent's office ready to
go to any part of the Location as soon as an alarm was received. Occasional
arrests were made mostly of natives found carrying dangerous weapons'. (37)
At the railway compounds, 'everything was also quiet', not least because of
the precaution taken 'of installing extra electric light ... which ... did
much to prevent a disturbance', and because 'large numbers of natives sat
together outside their huts . . . (as) a measure of self-protection (which)
was not interfered with by the authorities1. (38)
The atmosphere, though, remained highly charged. Europeans and Africans
in the nearby Sauerstownship were quick to believe rumours on Sunday
night that a 'roaming band of some 50 Matabele were marauding in the
district1. As the rumour spread, so did panic: 'Natives took refuge in
their employers' houses and the employers armed themselves with rifles,
revolvers and shotguns, telephoning the Police Station in town to let
them have more ammunition'. When motorcycle police were despatched to
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the township, they were unable to find any trace of the 'roaming band'. (39)
At the Location itself, a large number of Shona who had previously fled
from it, attempted to return at about 6 p.m. As the Shona approached, how-
ever, 'the Matabele turned out and made a hostile demonstration (before) being
driven back by the Police'. Carbutt thereupon decided not to allow any
Shona to enter the Location as he considered that the police could not protect
them adequately. Nor were Shona workers able to return to No. 2 railway
compound; as late as 2nd January they were still afraid to do so 'and
the natives there had stated that they would not have them back1. (40)
One fresh development had been the spread of fighting to the neighbouring
countryside during the night of 29th December. Rural disturbances were
apparently confined to the Mzingwane district where a band of some 30 Ndebele
attacked the huts of five Shona on Willsgrove Farm (41) as revenge for
the actions of two of the Shona who 'had previously molested an Ndebele Native
and damaged his bicycle'. Normally such an assault would have been a minor
affair, but because 'most of the natives concerned were employed in Bulawayo,
and knew of the disturbances there ... feelings ran high, and ... (they)
considered they were justified in punishing these Mashona'. Following the
attack, explained the local native commissioner, 'there was a tense feeling
along the Umguza (river), the Mashona expected to be attacked and burnt
out, and the Matabele thought Mashona re-inforcements would arrive and attack
their kraals'. (42) A second, but seemingly unrelated incident occurred
when a Shona visiting a nearby village accidently spilt beer over the feet
of three Ndebele. The men had 'taken the action for a deliberate insult,
and with one accord had set upon him and beaten him insensible'. (43)
After this point, the fighting more or less stopped. On Monday, 30th December,
the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. issued a press statement which claimed
that 'no disturbances of any importance were reported today from the rail-
way or from the location. A few minor arrests have been made and the position
generally is quiet ... While the trouble is not yet over and further
minor clashes are anticipated for the next few days, the general outlook is
peaceful1. (44) Carbutt concurred, and the next day decided that it was
'obviously necessary to test this situation' (45) of comparative calm.
Ndebele and Shona leaders were assembled and harangued in separate groups.
Carbutt spoke first to the Ndebele and then the Shona, warning both 'in
much the same terms' (46) to
'Stop these disturbances now, while there is time, before the
Government gets tired of merely separating the fights ... Many
of your people, I know, think that white people never kill
anyone, and that therefore no matter what they do, they will
only be fined or go to Gaol for a few months. Do not be
misled by that. There is a limit to all things, and if you
carry your determination to drive out the Mashona too far, it
can only lead to the Government having to resort to stronger
measures than it has already taken, even to the shooting of some
of the leaders of these disturbances ... I have warned you and the
responsibility for warning your people and stopping the disturbances
now rests with you*. (47)
The 'caution1, claimed Carbutt, 'was well received, and as a result of it
a better atmosphere appeared to prevail'. (48) Only one incident at
roughly this time threatened the restored quiet: a 'roving band1 of Shona
on the Bulawayo Commonage were reported as assaulting 'stray Matabele', but
their activities apparently were not sustained. (49)
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At the close of their meeting with Carbutt, the African leaders had told
him that if he 'would address a general meeting of the tribes in the same
terms, they thought peace would be restored'. (50) This was accordingly
arranged for 3 p.m. on Saturday, 4th January, in the Location. A strong
indication that the meeting would prove successful came several hours in
advance when at mid-day on Saturday, Carbutt went to No. 2 railway compound
to reinstate the Shona labourers who had been forced out a week previously.
When the compound inhabitants had been assembled, he bluntly warned them
that the compound 'did not belong to them, and that it was not for them to
say who could or could not occupy it1. Carbutt threatened the crowd that
anyone who interfered with the Shona would be severely dealt with and
'invited anyone present who did not agree with me, to say so at once, and
let us settle the matter'. As no one replied, Carbutt asked if he could
take it that 'the trouble was over and that the Mashonas would not be molested.
The crowd .... thereupon clapped their hands, signifying assent, and the
meeting dispersed, a good tempered tone being shown as they broke away'. (51)
This success was repeated at the mass meeting later the same afternoon where,
despite some 'murmurings' from the back of the crowd, all of the black
speakers also called for an end to the disturbances. (52) On the termination
of the speeches', explained a satisfied Carbutt, 'I asked the assemblage to
signify in the time honoured native manner their agreement to a termination
of hostilities. This they did unanimously. Thereafter they sang the National
Anthem and dispersed.' (53)
II
Bulawayo's 'knobkerrie warfare' had lasted about 12 days from beginning to
end, with major clashes confined to the weekend of Friday, 27th to Sunday,
29th December. In that time two people had been killed, between 40 and 50
seriously hurt, and just under 350 had been arrested and brought before the
magistrate's court, where the usual sentence was £5 or one month. (54)
And only a relatively massive show of force, coupled with threats to identi-
fiable 'native leaders', had brought the protracted unrest to an end.
The fighting had thoroughly alarmed the town and district's white population,
some of whom abandoned houses near the location 'and came to friends in the
town or stayed in hotels'; while in Sauerstownship 'the (white) women were
in a "mortal funk" throughout the trouble, and the women in the outlying
districts, whom I have known to have no fear of the native in the past, are
being affected in the same way'. (55) White farmers themselves were ex-
tremely concerned at the 'sullen air1 among their black labourers, and
fantasized about what would happen if one of the police 'patrols came into
touch with a gang of natives it could not control'. Because 'everything
hung on a delicate thread', the 'result would be taken as a difference be-
tween black and white'. (56) Nor did alarm immediately subside once the
fighting had been stopped; although anxious 'not to pitch an alarmist note1,
the Chronicle called for an investigation into African attitudes towards
native commissioners: 'Not only are the Naitive Commissioners representative
to the natives of the white race, but they are the representatives of
government, law and order. If there is any reason to suppose that the prestige
of these officials is being undermined no time should be lost .... to seek
out the cause1. (57) The Native Department, too, had a decided, if different
opinion about the significance of the fighting. Carbutt, himself a self-
confessed possessor of 'very strong views' on the subject of 'native control,
(58) had been quick to .argue for 'very strong action', because anything less
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'would be direct encouragement to assume a defiant attitude in
any other situation which may arise, which does not happen to
meet with their approval. Moreover if they are allowed to
have their way with the Mashona in Bulawayo, I have no doubt that
the movement will spread to the Mines and every industry in
Matabeleland, resulting in the disorganisation of labour, and
dictatorship by the Matabele, which cannot be tolerated'. (59)
But while the settler community, the Press and the Native Department might
quibble over the significance of the unrest and debate the relative merits
of teargas or low-flying aeroplanes for dealing with future disturbances, (60)
there was singular unanimity as to the nature of the conflict. All agreed
in seeing the fighting as ethnically inspired and ethnic in form. The press
in particular held a pronouncedly one-dimensional view. The Rhodesia Herald,
some 300 miles from the event, commented sourly that the 'the deplorable
faction fight between native tribes in Bulawayo is an ugly reminder of the
obstinate way in which feuds between tribes linger and break out into
violence on occasion1, (61) and managed in the space of a single editorial
to refer to 'frenzied outbreaks', 'savage mobs engaged in tribal squabbles',
and 'disturbing orgies'. (62) The Chronicle, on the spot and better in-
formed, actually attempted to obtain ' a native point of view* (which was
reproduced in the Herald) but even so, remained convinced that to label the
disturbances as 'inter-tribal' (62) was also enough to explain them.
Similarly, Carbutt and the Native Department persisted in viewing the 'tribal'
dimension as the determining factor, despite the existence, discussed later
in this paper, of contradictory albeit fragmentary evidence which their en-
quiries uncovered and which was incorporated in their reports.
Although obsessed with the 'tribal' aspect of the conflict, Carbutt did
recognise that the origin of the trouble could not be attributed to any
single cause, and concluded that the fighting 'was due to the cumulative
effect of many small incidents, some real and some imaginary, plus the effect
of false rumours, apparently deliberately circulated in order to inflame
tribal passions'. (64) His official report listed nine reasons for the
clashes, the last four of which were 'the false rumours' to the effect that
the Shona had cut the breasts off an Ndebele woman; that a man had had
his hands cut off ('attributed to both sides, and so equally inflaming
the passions of both'); that a large number of Ndebele had been killed
and that for every one so murdered, ten Shona must die; and, more specifi-
cally, the rumour which spread during the Location meeting of 28th December
that the Shona had killed an Ndebele less than a mile away, and which
Carbutt was convinced was 'the direct cause of the riot which took place
immediately afterwards*. (65)
Inflammatory as the rumours undoubtedly were, Carbutt nonetheless rated
them less important than five other reasons. Pride of place at the head
of the list went to undiluted 'tribal' animosity; 'the raking up of past
history, resulting in the engendering of animosity, by references to raiding
of the Mashonas by the Matabele in the past, and taunting the latter with
their inability to do so now1. The second reason for the fighting, said
Carbutt, was that Shona 'court Matabele women and seduce them from their
kraals, without paying lobola or consulting their parents', while thirdly
was the fact that the Shona worker 'comes to Matabeleland and by his com-
petition in the labour market lowers the rate of wages and gets the best
jobs'. Then, if these causes were not enough, there were also 'quarrels
arising at boxing contests and bioscope (cinema) entertainments (which)
lead to tribal partisanship followed by recriminations, and finally by open
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fighting1. And lastly, conflict was provoked by the 'allegation attributed
to the Mashona, and apparently believed, that they had purchased from me
or some other official the right to kill Matabele with impunity1 . (66)
Of all these highly varied reasons, the only one Carbutt deemed worthy of
comment concerned boxing and film shows, both of which were banned pending
Government investigation. He acknowledged the necessity of denying the
rumours but was otherwise silent about their origins. Nothing more was
said about the nature of Shona competition in the labour market or about
the allegations of bribery.
Ill
Carbutt's report clearly begged a great many questions and ignored even more,
It persistently begged the fundamental question of just who was fighting
whom and when, never mind why; nor did it make any effort to probe recent
developments in the labour market or in the Location; nor even to under-
stand why the customary tools of social control had broken down as far as
they had. In suggesting answers to these questions, it will be argued that
Bulawayo's 'knobkerrie warfare1 is intelligible only in the general context
of the town's economic and geographical situation within the regional
political economy, and specifically only in the context of the conditions,
controls and constraints existing in the Bulawayo Location and railway
compounds.
Bulawayo in 1929 was the largest town in Southern Rhodesia. Its total
estimated African population was close to 20 000 and there were well over
8000 whites. Over the preceeding two decades its black working population
had grown steadily from approximately 5000 in 1911 to 10 500 in 1926, until
by 1931 it numbered 16 000. (67) The origin of this pre-eminence and
expansion is not difficult to explain; from its colonial inception the
prosperity of Bulawayo had been closely tied to the development of Southern
Rhodesia's mining industry. Because Matabeleland was initially the centre
of gravity of the mining industry, Bulawayo became the colony's mining
capital and the headquarters of the Rhodesia Chamber of Mines from its
foundation in 1895. Thereafter the town served the mining industry; it
briefly boasted a stock-exchange in the 1890s, but more lasting development
was based on the growth of light engineering for the repair of mine
machinery and especially on the town's commercial function as an entrepot
for mining materials. (68) For almost 40 years 'all significant industrial
development ... was essentially in the interests of mining capital and it
was not until 1932 that the newly formed Bulawayo Chamber of Industries was
in a position to exhibit locally produced manufactures for the first time1.
(69)
Above all else, though, by the 1920s Bulawayo had become a railway town.
Although the railway too was a consequence of and intimately associated
with the fortunes of the mining industry, it nonetheless imparted a dis-
tinctive character to the town. Between 1919 and 1921 the central
mechanical workshops of Rhodesia Railways were built in Bulawayo, following
the decision to move the headquarters of the system from Umtali. These
relatively massive workshops (70) caused a substantial demand for labour;
white artisans were recruited from the Rand, Natal and Britain (71), while
the number of black workers in the two main railway compounds climbed from
roughly 850 in 1924 to about 1700 in early 1929. (72) Numbers continued
to rise throughout 1929, reaching an estimated 3000 in 1930, and frequently
were significantly higher when workers were temporarily concentrated in
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liulawayo before being parcelled out along branch lines. By the Latter date,
the railways were the largest single employer of black labour in Bulawayo,
although the biggest single group in employment were the 5500 domestic
servants, (74) almost all of whom lived outside the Location in the
ubiquitous 'kias' behind their employers1 houses.
Bulawayo also acted as an extremely important labour catchment area, both
for migrants seeking work on the relatively highly paid Matabeleland gold
mines, and for those whose ultimate destination was the Rand. This was
especially true of the so-called 'northern natives1 or 'Zambesi boys* from
Northern Rhodesia, for whom Bulawayo was the first large and comparatively
lucrative employment centre on their way south. Bulawayo's particular
situation thus made local workers, in this case the Ndebele, constantly
vulnerable to being undercut by cheaper immigrant labour. Before the mid-
19205, though, this structural vulnerability remained more or less
effectively hidden, as the Ndebele came to terms with the flow of northern
labour, either by themselves migrating to the higher wage centres of South
Africa or by remaining in those rural areas which were still viable. And
in any case, employment opportunities in Bulawayo itself were expanding
steadily.
Although still obscured, the growing weakness of the Ndebele position dated
from the end of the First World War. Demand generated by the war and
immediate post-war boom had temporarily arrested the underdevelopment of
Southern Rhodesia's African peasantry, but when the boom ended in 1921,
its effects were all the 'more sudden and drastic*. The 1921-3 slump in
cattle and maize prices 'radically altered the position of the African
peasants in the structure of the Rhodesian economy* and, together with the
later impact of the Great Depression, brought about 'a sharp increase in
African participation in the labour market*. (75) Related to this was the
fact that 'several Reserves' were becoming 'overcrowded' by 1926, and by
1928 'general overstocking' was reported, particularly from Matabeleland.
(76)
Ndebele and Shona workers appear to have responded to the deteriorating
conditions in the rural areas and their accelerating dependence on wage
employment in two main ways; by increased migration to South Africa (77)
or by taking employment in the local agricultural industry. Statistics
for the non-mining sector of Southern Rhodesia's economy are notoriously
infrequent and inexact, but it seems safe to assume that the increase in
indigenous labourers from c39 000 in 1923 to c70 688 in 1927 in non-mining
employment was confined very largely to agriculture (78) which was then
enjoying boom conditions. By contrast to the stagnant gold mining
industry, white commercial agriculture expanded massively in the 1920s,
having at last found a seemingly profitable and saleable crop in tobacco.
Between the 1923/4 and 1927/8 seasons, Virginia tobacco production leapt
from 3,8 million 1b. produced by 166 growers to 24,8 million lb. produced
by 987 growers. And because tobacco production was highly labour intensive,
requiring about 10 times as much labour as an equivalent area of maize,
the number of Africans (including foreigners) employed in agriculture
increased from 58 542 in 1921 to 83 985 in 1927/8. (79) But the boom was
short-lived; the 1928 crop proved virtually unsaleable and*brought ruin
to all but a handful of growers'. By 1930 some 700 growers had abandoned
the tobacco industry, production had fallen back to 5J million lb. and as
early as April 1928 a severe retrenchment of black labour had begun. (80)
All in all, well over 10 000 Southern Rhodesian Africans lost their jobs in
agriculture. (81)
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This unemployment crisis was felt most heavily in Mashonaland where the
tobacco farms were concentrated, and obliged work-seekers to look beyond
the province's boundaries. To many Shona workers expelled from the tobacco
industry, Matabeleland, and specifically Bulawayo, must have looked especially
promising, with the prospects of work in farming, on the railways or in the
myriad of occupations in the town itself.
Unlike Mashonaland, commercial agriculture in Matabeleland had neither
boomed nor gone bust in the 1920s; its two staples continued as maize and
ranching, and it had the further advantage from the prospective migrant's
point of view that its average farm wages in 1927-8 were 21-23/- p.m.,
compared to 18/- in Mashonaland. (82) Neither feature unduly impressed
Ndebele labourers, many of whom avoided farm work and went south, to the
considerable exasperation of local farmers. 'To a great extent1, complained
one farmer near Bulawayo at the end of 1926, 'the kraals in this part of
the country are peopled by natives who have been for some years working in
Johannesburg' . (83)
Those Ndebele who did work on local farms drew on their knowledge of the
South African market and asked for wages which Southern Rhodesian farmers
were not prepared to pay. Demands for higher wages were translated by
settlers as 'insolence' (84) and were often linked by farmers to the
growing preference of the Ndebele for selling beer to meet their cash
requirements. Consequently, 'farmers, if they could possibly get other
than Matabele boys did so ... the Matabele natives were becoming so slack
and careless that their positions were being taken by aliens'. (85) Of
particular significance was the fact that at least some of the 'aliens'
were Shona, as evidenced, for example, by the Ndebele attack on the
Willsgrove farm workers during the December 1929 disturbances. Intense
job competition was also manifest on the railways, where wages were
higher (40/- p.m. without food) and in whose Bulawayo compounds were
approximately 300 Shona by the end of 1929, and especially for the better-
paying positions in town and as domestic servants. In both of the latter
two categories the Shona enjoyed considerable and much resented success. (86)
The Shona were not the only outsiders seeking work in Bulawayo; throughout
1929 the flow of labour from north of the Zambezi continued as the 'usual
steady influx1, and the two combined meant that 'there is a surplus of
labour and Labour Agents and Employers find the town a happy hunting ground
for recruits'. (87) So huge was the surplus that when in the middle of
1930 it was necessary to recruit temporary labour for a new sewerage scheme
for the town, the contractors were able to find about 1600 workers locally
with 'little difficulty'. (88)
That more and more people were congregating in Bulawayo seeking work but
usually without success, is indicated by the pattern of crime in the town.
In Southern Rhodesia as a whole, the number of cases reported rose from
46 335 in 1928, to 50 221 in 1929 to 57 756 in 1930; while over the same
period the number of cases dealt with in Bulawayo increased by 33,8%, the
highest of anywhere in the country. (89) The great majority of the offences
were 'minor'; contraventions of the pass laws, municipal bye-laws, the dog
tax ordinance, the kaffir beer ordinance and so on. But this in itself is
not without significance: as workers and peasants were squeezed, so the
increasingly difficult and lengthy search for work raised the risk of
running foul of the pass and municipal laws, as well as the temptation to
seek a living in any way possible. Certainly the Commissioner of Police
held the opinion that a contributory cause of the increase in crime was
'unemployment among the native population, leading to loafing'. (90)
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For local workers, and especially the Ndebele, the whole situation was
seriously complicated by the South African Government policy enforced in
1928 of gradually repatriating Africans from north of latitude 22° south to
their countries of origin. This policy, which affected Africans from
Southern Rhodesia as well as those from further north, was deeply resented,
and towards the end of 1928 the Native Department in Bulawayo intercepted
'three anonymous letters, together with a newspaper cutting, from local
natives employed in Johannesburg'. The letters objected 'to the notices
served on them in the Union to return to their own country', argued that.in
turn 'all foreign natives should be ejected 'from Southern Rhodesia, and
suggested 'agitating' for this end through 'their Chiefs'. (91)
Ndebele labourers were now in the intolerable and novel position of being
squeezed from both domestic and foreign labour markets. For the first time,
they were vulnerable to competition or even displacement in the labour
market at precisely the same time the viability of their rural areas was
being noticeably eroded. In addition to the established competition of
'northern* labour, the Ndebele also faced an influx of Shona migrants which
must have seemed especially ominous when Ndebele migration to South Africa
was threatened with curtailment. And on top of these wider forces and
pressures were the very alienating stresses of living inside the Location
and compounds, at the mercy of a corrupt Location Superintendent and venal
Municipality.
IV
The Location, 'ill-defined and unfenced1, was situated adjacent to and to
the west of Bulawayo itself, and in 1930 covered 64£ acres, divided into an
estimated 586 stands. (92) Initially, location dwellers simply rented
stands, measuring 40' x 80', from the Municipal Council for 5/- per month.
There were 'no restrictions on the type or number of dwellings' which could
be built on each stand, but eventually the layout of the Location 'became
so confused and the living conditions so unhygenic, that the Municipal
Council in 1921 decided to build standard dwellings where the tenant refused
or was unable to build a suitable house'. From 1924 onwards this policy was
intensified, and, explained a later commission of enquiry, 'apparently stung
to action by the threat underlying the policy many plot holders purchased
bricks and built cottages of suitable materials and dimensions on their
plots1. By 1929-30, then, the Location was characterized by two conditions
of occupation - those who still had their own houses on plots leased from
the Municipal Council, and a growing majority who rented cottages or rooms
from the Council - and by four types of buildings. These comprised
municipal barracks (single rooms) and cottages, and privately owned cottages,
and huts or shanties. The only substantial buildings were a brewery and
beerhall erected in 1913, and the house and office of the Location Super-
intendent built in 1919. It was the opinion of the Town Engineer that in
1921 these were 'the only decent buildings in the Location1.
In essence, what the Municipal programme represented for the great majority
of Location dwellers was an attack on their already precarious standard of
living. Although the new cottages may have been an immediate improvement
over some of the huts and shanties described as 'small, old, unsightly and
unsuitable1, even this is debatable. Municipal cottages consisted of two
living rooms and a kitchen, no verandah, no internal door, no ceiling and
no floors. There were persistent complaints about leaking roofs and about
the lack of privacy, and even officials admitted in 1930 that 50 of the
cottages constructed early in the scheme would have to be rebuilt. Much
more important, though, were two other consequences of the programme.
Perhaps the one which affected the greatest number of people was the fact
that the official building programme aggravated rather than eased severe
overcrowding. At no point before 1930 did the Municipality erect additional
housing as opposed to pulling down existing private dwellings and replacing
them with cottages or barracks which usually totalled a smaller number of
rooms. The results, at a time when Bulawayo's African population was
growing swiftly, were entirely predictable. In the comparatively small
area of the Location were packed an estimated 5550 people, jostling for a
quite inadequate number of rooms. The 1930 Commission found four men and
two women in one room 10' x 12', and elsewhere discovered 'several rooms
of equal dimensions occupied by numbers of Natives varying from six to
eleven1. Further examples included the case of 40 people living in one
three-roomed house, and the opinion of the Location Superintendent that he
could let 150 cottages, if available, at a day's notice.
Together with shoddy accommodation and over-crowding went the extremely
high rentals levied by the Municipality. Whereas before the mid-192Os,
most people had been 'at liberty to build huts or other such cheap
habitations as their means would allow', (93) they now had to contend with
rentals described by the 1930 Commission as 'exorbitant'. Single rooms
were let for 10/- and cottages for 15/- per month. Where cottages had an
electric light bulb installed an extra 3/- per month was charged for a
service which was switched off at 10.30 p.m. In relation to the average
monthly wage then paid in Bulawayo - estimated variously at between 40/-
with rations and 50/- without food - the rentals were clearly excessive.
Women complained that 'our menfolk do not get paid sufficiently for them
to be able to pay 15/~ per month', while the Chief Native Commissioner,
too, conceded that 'a rental of 15/- a month for a man whose wage is
small - say, £2 a month - would be a heavy liability to meet1. (94) Just
how heavily this liability weighed was forcibly explained by the ICU:
'I took a man earning £2 and eating his own food.
Some men are earning 30/-, 1/- a day and eating
his own food. How can he live? See, there are
houses in the Location for married couples. They
pay 15/- per month without light ... That 15/-
taken from £2 leaves 25/-. And now mealie meal
and wood 10/- per month leaves 15/-. 10/- for
mealie meal; it leaves 5/-; and you have light,
wife and children ... No wonder that our women
are selling their bodies'. (95)
A further example taken from the budget of three workers, all of whom earned
more than the average, is not appreciably different. Each month they paid
7/6 for sugar, 3/6 for '1 lb. of Mazawattee tea1 and 4/- for tinned milk.
In winter between 10/- and 15/- per month was spent on wood for heating,
which did not leave much over for basic foodstuffs. For those earning the
average wage or less, the only solution lay in a further aggravation of
overcrowded rooms, by spreading the rental burden over as many people as
possible.
While the impact of the municipal building programme affected the entire
Location community, it posed a direct threat to one particular group. These
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were the black landlords, seemingly fairly large in number, and including
several women whose rented rooms were their sole means of livelihood. In
the past, prospective landlords had been able to erect as many buildings
as they wished on their leased stands, and 'the position of the householder
was such.that his outlay on buildings soon repaid him in rentals'. A
fairly typical example of this 'well-known system' was the stand leased
(for 5/- per month) by one Mahenga Manbe 'with seven dwellings thereon ...
which premises she sublet as follows: 5 at 7/6 per month - £1.17.6 and 2
at 10/- per month - £1.0.0.' (96) At first it seemed as if the more
affluent landlords might escape the full consequences of municipal policy
by rebuilding their dwellings from suitable materials, but shortly after
this was done, the Council abruptly changed its policy. Towards the end
of 1929 it decided to acquire ownership of all the houses in the Location
and withdraw 'without notice1 the long-established 'privilege' of building
houses on stands rented from the Council. (97) In the face of the ensuing
protest, the Council smoothly disavowed any intention of 'exercising their
powers arbitrarily', promised full compensation for .demolished buildings,
and left the Native Department to calm the 'not unnatural' anxiety of the
Location dwellers. (98) Although Carbutt thought that his public explanation
of Council intentions was considered 'satisfactory* by his audience, he was
obviously mistaken. Some months later the visiting Commission of Enquiry
was treated to bitter complaints on exactly that subject:
'In these days we enjoy no peace or happiness.
The Council treats us as weeds and refuse to be
thrown out. The Council has done many things to
show that it does not now want us in the
Location ... Until recently we were encouraged to
build substantial brick houses in the Location ...
We are now told that our houses must be
demolished ... (nor does) the amount of compen-
- sation ... cover the cost of labour and material'.
Similar complaints were made by other witnesses.
From the evidence available, it would seem that the only rack-renting slum
landlord in the Location was the Municipality; for an unknown but probably
appreciable number of people the renting out of a room had brought in much-
needed income, support which was now lost as the Municipality inexorably
enforced its monopoly. Indeed, not only were these Location dwellers being
deprived of one source of income, they were also being obliged to pay higher
rents.
By comparison with, the Location, disappointingly little is known about the
material conditions of existence in the railway compounds. Although some
railway workers were housed in the Location, most were in two separate
compounds, No. 2 and No. 4, near the railway yards and the railway suburb
of Raylton. The biggest compound was No. 2 which apart from its 'permanent'
inhabitants, regularly had a large floating population of batches of 200 or
more labourers destined for outlying regions of the system. Before 1924
this group was housed under nothing more than bucksails, which were
eventually replaced by 'shelters of corrugated iron on poles'. Accom-
modation for the workers permanently based in Bulawayo consisted, in both
compounds, of a mixture of brick barracks (with 'detachable iron bunks')
for single men and pole and dagga huts and barrack rooms for the minority of
married couples. (99) As the number of workers expanded, though, so over-
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crowding became severe. Whereas in 1924 housing in No. 2 compound had been
considered by the Compound Inspector to be 'ample' if 'a little coniested'
in the married quarters (100), by 1927 it was euphemistically described as
'somewhat crowded'. In No. 4, between 15 and 17 men were crammed into 12-
berth rooms, and ''in some cases married men are also housed in these rooms,
mixed with the other1. An overflow of 120 men were placed in the Location,
where they had to pay for their accommodation. (101) Two years later, the
shortage of railway housing was still acute, and the case of the
workers was taken up by the ICU. These complaints were brushed aside by
the Chief Native Commissioner, despite the Medical Director's observation
that 'a circular hut, 12' in diameter, with no adjunct in the way of a
kitchen or washing place, is hardly adequate for a married man and a family,
even if they are native*. (102)
V
The 'sordid, overcrowded existence1 (103) of Bulawayo's black working class
was shaped not only by the poor and inadequate accommodation, low wages and
high rentals recounted above, but was maintained and ordered by several
forms of control exercised variously by the Municipality and the state.
Most obvious of the mechanisms of control was the menace of the location
police, after which came the less immediate social controls of prostitution,
beer and recreation. Because of lack of material concerning the railway
compounds, discussion will be confined almost exclusively to the Location
where, in any case, matters were given a dramatic twist through the arrest
and conviction in the latter part of 1929 of the Location Superintendent and
several of his assistants on various charges of corruption.
Throughout the 1920s control of the Bulawayo Location was organised around
a single white Superintendent and ten 'native police1. The Superintendent
was ultimately responsible through the Town Clerk to the Finance Committee
of the Municipal Council, but in practice little supervision was exercised
over him and he was considered to have 'had unfettered control of the
Location since its inception1 (104) Below the Superintendent came the
Location police whose duty, said the 1930 Commission was 'mainly that of
sanitary inspectors. They assist in rent collecting and in general minor
disciplinary measures'- The Commission made no further remarks about the
location police beyond observing that 'when properly controlled there is no
reason to doubt that they do their duty humanely and well1.
This was in sharp contrast to both the findings of the Commission in
Salisbury and of 'expert' witness in Bulawayo. The situation in Salisbury
in 1930 was one where
'Native witnesses allege that these police mis-
represent them to the Superintendent, oppress them
in petty ways, and show undue favouritism. Their
ministrations are certainly not popular ... It was
urged that Natives of different tribes should be
engaged for this work and that care should be
exercised in selecting responsible married men.
Perhaps the worst charge brought against the Native
Police is that they are in league with women of
loose morals in whose interests they use their
influence ... to secure tenancy of rooms and
buildings'. (105)
- 17 -
In fact, such material as there is suggests that all of these charges,
which were repeated in virtually every compound in the colony (106) also
applied to the Bulawayo Location police. Although the evidence consulted is
absolutely silent about the ethnic composition of the Location police, some
compensatory glimpses of their social composition can be derived from
Carbutt's cryptic observation that they enjoyed 'no prestige1, and from the
opinion of Major Brundell of the local C.I.D. that 'regarding the inves-
tigation of crime, the Municipal employees are unable to keep proper control.
Manyena, late head messenger of the Location was discharged from the Police
for misconduct and he had a criminal record. This goes to show that the
boys selected as police boys by the Municipality are appointed irrespective
of their antecedents'. Brundell had good reason to know exactly what he
was talking about; in the last three months of 1929 he had uncovered a
large number of cases in which 'Native Sergeant Manyena and other members
of the Location Native Police' had indulged in forgery, the collection of
rents without issuing receipts and generally had 'exercised improper
authority and illegal power and committed many irregularities'. (107)
Behind the Location Superintendent and his 'native police' lay the much more
formidable power of the British South Africa Police and the C.I.D. In the
case of the Bulawayo Location, though, it was a matter of considerable
concern and complaint to the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. that its
ambiguous legal position prevented closer control and hampered 'proper
supervision'. Under the vague regulations by which the Location was
administered, reported Brundell, it was 'unnecessary for natives to comply
with the pass laws while in the confines of the Municipal Location', and
nor could people who were 'on the Location ground unlawfully ... be
prosecuted because it has been held that, owing to the indefinite nature
of the boundary, natives cannot know when they are within the confines of
the Location'. He regretted that there were 'no regular patrols of police
through the Location1 and explained that a 'certain official of the Municipality
raised an objection to a past practice of the Police of raiding the Location.
The Police, as a body, feel hampered by the existing regulations, which
prevent real contact with affairs in the Location.'
The Chief Superintendent's fears and objections were not shared by everyone.
Indeed, roughly one year after Brundell faced the 1930 Commission, a member
of the Legislative Assembly praised the system in operation in Bulawayo and
remained convinced that 'nothing is more likely to stir up trouble in these
locations than to allow the native police to enter those locations at any
time they may so desire1. (108) Support for restricting the entry of black
police to the Location was quickly forthcoming from another member rep-
resenting a Bulawayo constituency, who rose to inform the Assembly that he
personally had witnessed Africans being 'persecuted' by black policemen:
'the "Black Watch" in Bulawayo very often treat their own people in this
way, and haul them to court for all sorts of petty offenses'. (109) In
practice, though, as the Location Superintendent admitted, it was only
uniformed police who were excluded, not the C.I.D., whose raids were
frequently and vehemently denounced by the I.C.U. Speaking in July 1929,
Masoja accused the Bulawayo Council of treating fus like thieves in our own
Location, they are always sending the C.I.D. to raid us'. (110) Nor was that
all; by 1930 and undoubtedly from much earlier, the Location police also
raided regularly in the process of searching 'each house for sick persons
each day'. Either way for Bulawayo's black working class, the attentions
of the Location police and the C.I.D. were an unavoidable reality of
Location life.
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Location dwellers had not only to deal with the police, they had also to
come to terms with an all-powerful and corrupt Location Superintendent. (Ill)
From June 1919 until his arrest in October 1929, this was T.E. Vawdrey. An
apparently long trail of corruption only came to light in early September
1929 when Vawdrey went on holiday and 'a complaint was received from
certain natives that money had been paid by them to Native Sergeant Manyena
of the Location Police as rent ... and for which no receipts had been given1.
(112) Investigation of this complaint led to the discovery of so 'many
irregularities, corrupt practices and criminal acts', that subsequent
enquiries 'as far as possible ... (were) confined to the months of January
to August1 of 1929 as they would otherwise have proved 'interminable'. (113)
All in all, what these 'irregularities' and 'corrupt practices' amounted to
in the estimation of the C.I-D. was that there had been Tan entire absence
of organisation, system, supervision and control over the conduct and
management of the Bulawayo Location affairs for some years, resulting in
grave abuses and the commission of crimes by Municipal employees to the
detriment of the natives resident in the Location; further, the authorities
have apparently been defrauded for many years of monies, the amount of which
may be estimated but cannot definitely be ascertained'. (114)
The C.I.D. first discovered that Vawdrey (as well as his African clerk,
police sergeant and two constables) had 'permitted well known natives to
occupy premises in the ... Location for years without payment of rent1;
had collected rent without giving any or proper receipts; and had hired
out the Beer Hall, again without issuing receipts. In one tantalising
instance, they also uncovered a hint of Vawdrey's toleration of, if not
actual involvement in Location vice; the C.I.D. noted that a further matter
requiring investigation was the 'deceased estate of a notorious prostitute
and seller of kaffir beer, one Ndebazana, which was valued at some hundreds
of pounds and it appears at present has only partly been administered by
T.E. Vawdrey'. (115)
As the investigation proceeded, some idea of the range of Vawdrey1s criminal
activities began to emerge. At various times he had lined his own pockets
by using municipal transport to carry building sand, for which Africans
were charged; since 1925 one individual had enjoyed a rent-free cottage in
return for doing the Vawdrey household washing; and on a number of
occasions Vawdrey had made demands for rents already paid. Perhaps the most
telling example of Vawdrey's determination to extract all possible financial
advantage from his position of 'unfettered control' was his habit of forcing
newcomers to the Location, while temporarily accommodated in the 'casual
ward1, to collect bones which he sold on his own behalf to the African
Explosives and Imperial Cold Storage companies. Africans had little choice
but to comply with Vawdrey1s instructions, because their registration cer-
tificates were confiscated until their tasks were completed. (116) When
asked why they had not complained earlier, Location inhabitants replied that
they thought that the rules of the Municipality 'authorised the management
as conducted', and more cogently, that they 'were afraid to complain for
fear of being expelled from the Location'. (117)
From these many offences the C.I.D. consolidated six charges of corruption
and theft, (118) and in November, 1929, Vawdrey was brought to trial. In
December he was found guilty and sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with
hard labour. Predictably enough, the white jury promptly entered a recom-
mendation of leniency, 'pointing out Vawdrey's splendid record and the
amount of good work he had done for the Council in the reconstruction of the
Location1, (119) and even the Mayor and Deputy Mayor were less than critical
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when they subsequently praised Vawdrey's 'excellent work1. (120) What
Vawdrey's peers and employers were prepared to forgive and forget, however,
was less easily forgotten by his black victims. Although no record
survives of their feelings beyond a single indirect complaint of a few
months later - 'a new Location Superintendent is appointed each year and
each Superintendent introduces new regulations ... we are troubled and
tired of the constantly changed rules' (121) - it is clear that Vawdrey's
corrupt regime left an explosive legacy.
The essence of the legacy was summed up in the remarkable admission by the
Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D. in 1930 that the 'population of the
Location is an unknown quantity1. (122) Such an admission was a direct
contradiction of the basic function of urban locations in southern Africa,
where, along with compounds and reserves, they were an essential institution
of labour repression. John Rex has emphasized the central importance to
the system of the 'harassment and close scrutiny and supervision of
inhabitants which goes on in the locations'. The key figure was that of
the location superintendent who, together with his location police, was
responsible for 'implementing the dozens of laws which in his everyday
life the migrant ... might break. In the location a continuous programme
of pass raids, liquor raids and other forms of harassment creates a total
insecurity which effectively prevents any but completely clandestine
political organisation'. (123) But in the Bulawayo Location it was
precisely this system of close scrutiny which was incomplete.
There was no plan of the Location and, as Major Brundell never tired of
reminding the 1930 Commission, there was 'no proper supervision.1
Corruption was not conducive to accurate records, and not surprisingly
it was discovered that the 'old (Location) register was faked from
beginning to end and the summary of receipts (for plots, cottages, lodgers,
etc.) were always quite inaccurate1. (124) Vawdrey, of course, did not act
in a vacuum and it would be an over-simplification to lay the blame for the
absence of close control solely at his door. His activities remained
undetected for so long at least partly because he was able to take full
advantage of the distinctly cool relations between the Municipality and the
police over the Location. This relationship, which saw the Location as 'a
private reserve of the Municipality1 (125) effectively precluded regular
uniformed police patrols, and left Vawdrey and his accomplices virtually
free to pursue their own special interests. Revolving as they did around
corruption and favouritism, these interests lent themselves more readily
to extortion and harassment rather than to close control over the Location
population. Instead of systematic scrutiny, 'it appeared for some time
that any native was given permission to be in the Location, simply by
reason that he had asked for such permission1, (126) until in the end no-
one was certain either of the size or the composition of the Location
population.
VI
For the various reasons described above, the system of direct control in
the Bulawayo Location fell far short of what it should have been. Even at
its 'ideal' form, though, urban location control was rarely as pervasively
coercive as the compound system, not least because the highly diffuse
production imperatives of urban employers were very different from the dis-
tinctive constraints operating in the mining industry. Nevertheless,
municipal authorities still sought to emulate, albeit in a somewhat watered
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down form and for their own reasons, the mining industry dream of total
control over the lives of black workers. But because the social life of the
locations and compounds did not produce a single, uniform and predictable
consequence, it was an extraordinarily difficult element for the state or
management to control.
Both in the locations and the compounds, control over beer and women was an
exercise bristling with contradictions. (127) In common with the rest of •
southern Africa, beer brewing in the Bulawayo Location was a municipal
monopoly. The reason for this was quite strightforward; it theoretically
provided a source of revenue funded by the black location dwellers them-
selves for the provision of basic services. (128) Bulawayo's white rate-
payers readily embraced this theory and in 1913 the brewery was launched
with the express and much-publicised intention of funding the transformation
of the Location 'into a model township by creating proper streets etc1. It
was, announced the Mayor, to be 'for the sole benefit of the Natives1. (129)
Instead practice proved quite the reverse. Brewery profits were diverted
almost completely to other ends; until the disturbances of December 1929,
Location streets were entirely unlit, sanitation was bad, and there were
no medical facilities of any sort in the case of accidents or illness. (130)
Subsequent investigators criticised the Municipality's accounting pro-
cedure as 'merely a method of appropriating to General Revenue the profit
of the Brewery', and concluded that no opportunity 'to debit the Brewery
with expenditure seems to have been lost1. By 1930, an estimated
£40 000 of brewery profits were unaccounted for, presumably absorbed into
the Municipality's General Revenue. (131)
The attitudes of Bulawayo's black working class towards the Municipal beer-
hall were mixed; in the first place, they were well aware of the broad
outlines, if not the exact details, of municipal venality and complained
frequently 'that the Europeans were profiteering from the Beer Hall business
which they themselves were not permitted to carry on1. (132) The second
attitude was less straightforward although no less clear; beer was
generally welcomed as a cheap and necessary form of relaxation but the
municipal monopoly and the irritating regulations of the beer hall were
thoroughly disliked. Lastly, the beerhall was often regarded as an alien
place where children and wives were lost to the control of parents and
husbands. (133) In short, it acted as a catalyst on the social disintegra-
tion and demoralisation of Location dwellers.
Similarly contradictory and not easily predictable in its effects was the
impact of prostitution. Municipal policy was simple; officially, pro-
stitution was condemned, while in practice it was tolerated as a minimal
concession to the sexual needs of male workers. The Location management
attitude was neatly caught in the allegation by some outraged Location
inhabitants that prostitutes were 'permitted to hire cottages from the
Municipality simply because they are able to pay rent and they have
cottages in preference to working men'. (134) And, as suggested earlier,
Vawdrey himself may have been closely involved. (135)
In some respects, the Bulawayo Location was markedly different from the
mining compounds; the presence of women was acknowledged and 'family'
cottages were built. In every other respect, however, the Location
pattern followed that of the compounds, particularly as urban earnings too
were based on the assumption that the migrant worker1 s family were taken
care of by, if not actually in, the rural areas. This 'economic denial of
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the existence of women1 had two important consequences.. (136) One was a
'structural imbalance in the sex ratios1 within the Location, although
never quite as pronounced as in the compounds. Out of an estimated
population of 5500 in 1930, no less than 4200 were men. Of the remainder,
600 were children and only 750 were adult women. (137) The other con-
sequence was that it placed many of the women who did live there in a
state of chronic financial deprivation and insecurity, (138) thus creating
the conditions for prostitution in large numbers. Location prostitution
was described by the C.I.D. in 1930 as 'habitual1, (139) by which time it
was customary for Indian traders to 'take car loads of women to the various
mines round Bulawayo so that they may earn money from the natives employed
there*. (140) Six years later, the Native Department thought that of the
1225 women then in the Location, 300 were prostitutes, 725 were 'concubines1
and 200 were married. (141)
The structural denial of family life and the toleration of prostitution
directly contributed to an appalling still-birth rate. There was no
registration of births and the Location Superintendent himself had known
of '8 or 10 still-births in a month1. Overall, it was estimated that 98
per cent of the children in the Location were still-born. (142) These and
other multiplying signs of the disintegration of their society in the 1920s
sufficiently alarmed some groups in the Location to cause them to approach
the Government, and later beseige the 1930 Commission, with general com-
plaints about Location conditions, prominent among which was concern about
growing 'immorality'. (143) This was a sympton of the previously discussed
gradual economic decline of the Ndebele peasantry in the late 1920s and
more immediately of the intensified competition in the labour market from
1928 onwards, both of which ensured that it assumed a distinctly 'ethnic1
character. Almost invariably, 'immorality' must have involved Ndebele
women selling their favours to foreigners, including Shona migrants, who
were successfully competing with the Ndebele for work (sometimes to the
point of supplanting them) and who had money to compensate for their
absence from home. This dimension was especially problematic in the par-
ticular conditions of the Location where 'no native can be sure of his
wife' (144) and, where additionally, as in the mine compounds, 'perhaps
inevitably, violence ... surrounded the adult women'. (145) Of particular
importance was the consideration that women who often 'owed their only
allegiance to the highest bidder acted as a catalyst of conflict among poorer
workers. Thus much of the black workers' energy and wrath was directed
against fellow workers while the fundamental cause of the conflict and
competition lay outside the compound', (146) or, as in this case, the
Location.
Essentially, Bulawayo seems to have anticipated by a few years a development
which was heightened elsewhere in Southern Rhodesia by the Great Depression.
This was the 'unrest' reported in early 1931 among black compound
inhabitants, 'both indigenous and non-indigenous, owing to the ever
increasing ^ immorality amongst them'. The report emphasized that
'Indigenous natives appear to be the greatest
sufferers. They are being ousted in the field
of labour everywhere owing to their unreliability
and the periods of labour they offer as compared
with the non-indigenous native. This fact they
are realising and feeling greatly. In addition
to this their women folk are being attracted in
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large numbers by the lure of the compound life and the material
gain they can procure in this life by means of promiscuous
co-habitation and prostitution.
A state of antagonism is growing between indigenous and non-
indigenous natives which is not healthy and may have far-reaching
consequences on non-indigenous natives seeking work in this colony.' (147)
Unlike the larger mining companies who had earlier sought to defuse these
potentially violent contradiction arising from workers relying exclusively
on beer and prostitutes for recreation, organised sport formed no part of
the pattern of social control in the Bulawayo Location before the 1930s (148)
The absence of organised sport was strongly regretted by Carbutt, but his
advocacy of its introduction . (149) went unheeded, and for much of the 1920s
and '30s African recreation was neither controlled nor provided for.
Instead, Africans were left to their own devices and in 1938, for example,
on their Sunday afternoons off, congregated 'in their thousands' on an
area of waste ground near the Location where they made their own entertainment:
1
 football matches attract, at most, a few hundred, but the majority make
their own enjoyment by singing, dancing or boxing, or by watching others in-
dulge in such activities'. (150) Of these activities, boxing was by far and
away the most popular, and merits examination in some detail because of
the light it casts on a whole area of working class expression which was
allegedly a major cause of the December 1929 'faction fighting'. (151)
The unsurpassed popularity of boxing in the 1920s and 1930s was attributed
by the Native Department, in the first instance, to 'the inherent communica-
bility of the form of boxing. It involves no expense except the gloves and
those used by the Native may be old cast-offs or merely a rag wrapped round
the fist. It requires no organization, no special place. As such it holds
advantages over all other European games'. (152) Equally important, thought
the Native Department, was its compatibility 'with the preceeding culture.
When asked what he associated boxing with back in the reserve an acknowledged
leader recalled the wrestling matches (tsimba) that herdboys indulged in
and the battles with sticks (zuvara) that took place when one group of
herd boys drove a rival group away and took charge of their cattle - to the
glee of the old people who looked on. "The difference is that now we use
fists", he concluded1. And lastly, was boxing's cathartic function 'for
those vital feelings which are denied an outlet in the town life of Natives.
The strong emotional appeal it has attained, the emotional and social
identity it provokes in tribe and boxing gatherings, the relief it affords
from the isolated and monotonous daily round in an alien household or store -
all these and probably many more factors must contribute to the powerful
attraction of boxing'.
In Salisbury, boxing was organised around a number of 'tribal1 clubs which
had arisen 'quite spontaneously'. The clubs comprised the 'Wakorekore, the
WaManyika, the Zesum, the WaBudjga and the MaBlantyre'. This latter club in-
cluded most Malawi peoples and its members word black and red vests with a
'V 8' badge which symbolised association 'with the power of the Ford1. By
contrast the 'WaKorekore' wore red and were known as the 'Dangers'. Nothing
definite was known about the other three clubs, the only information coming
from 'one informant (who) characterised the 'WaZezuru and WaBudjga
"as being green"1* Each club had its own officials, sometimes in some kind
of uniform, who kept the crowd out of the ring, with the help of sticks and
sjamboks.
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At matches, club members and the audience generally ranged themselves on
opposite sides of the ring, 'the WaKorekore, the MaBlantyre, the WaManyika
on the one side, the WaZezuru and WaBudjga on the other1. (153) Although
junior members of the same club boxed among themselves, club leaders would
only box 'representatives of other clubs and there is much banter, tribal
self-praise and disparagement of othe is when a boxer struts into the ring
to await a challenge1. The boxing itself was usually stylised to the point
where the Native Department investigation was impressed by the readiness of
the competitors 'to smile and enjoy a futile swing, often both parties
pausing in the middle of a round to enjoy the joke1, and concluded that the
'clustering of emotions in and round the ring is more reminiscent of solo
dancing than of any raw fighting spirit*.
The moment of greatest potential trouble apparently arose when the bouts were
over and the crowd was dispersing. With enthusiasm still at its height,
'but its controlling focus.... suddenly removed and with no line of attention
to hold it, it is extremely liable to break out.... in very petty directions -
a scornful word, a tribal boast, a bicycle accident, may easily start riotous
trouble'. Rioting was a 'regular occurence' and before official control was
imposed, 'spectators went armed - sticks, axes and knobkerries up their
sleeves, down their trowsers (sic) and in their shirts, bicycle chains and
pockets full of stones. The sale of beer worsened the proceedings, also
the high-handed use of shambocks (sic) used by the "officials" to clear a
ring and maintain order. Prostitutes also attended and their voluble bestowals
of praise and taunts provoked the extremes of jealousy which attach to sex1.
In both Bulawayo and Salisbury, a further indication of boxing's popularity
in the '20s and '30s, and the extent to which 'the sport was integrated
into Native life', was the important and distinctive role played in it by
magic. Mangoromera, 'a medicine introduced into the Colony sometime about
1924 by Portuguese Natives from Sena, and from other territories', was
highly prized as conferring 'unusual strength and fearlessness'. (154)
Its properties were derived
'from the skins of such animals as the lion, elephant,
hippo, honeybear, crocodile, the head of a black mamba,
two kinds of fish found in the Zambesi and various herbs.
Pieces from each are burned together and pounded into powder.
The compound is rubbed into incisions made in the wrists of
those desiring increased strength. A person wishing to be a
tower of strength will go as far as to have all his joints
doctored as well as his chest. Some wear wrist guards
(leather or python skin) which have been soaked in the preparation.
The medicine is sometimes sewn into the wrist guards'. (155)
The attraction of mangoromera for boxers was immediate and obvious;
customers were told that in exchange for anything from 5/- to 30/- they 'will
possess great strength and bravery and will be feared by the uninitiated....
their strength will be such that their blows will cause fatal results or at
any rate K.O. their victims'. (156) Not many were willing to disprove the
efficacy of the treatment, and on one occasion the Native Commissioner for
Salisbury saw 'in a private compound... a Native wearing such bands on both
wrists and offering challenges to anyone to box but in spite of the urgings
of the European manager.... not one would accept the challenge'. (157)
No less immediate and obvious were the attractions of mangoromera for groups
other than boxers. As the Native Department report appreciated, the prime
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f unc t ion of rnaj', i c was to mod i at:c nnz i ety, and in t he case of boxing,
rnera v/.'is admirably suited to afford relief from, and control over 'the
tz'- i t erncnt , tin- :;.!. r<:-;.s and si ra i n of ant i c i pal i on , (nnd) I he hazardous nature
of the result1. M58) liuL if it could do that, it could also be used to
combat that more pressing demands and alienation of location existence. For
this reason, mangoromera was 'much sought after by the youths in the towns',
who, at a time of intensifying competition for work, themselves constituted
one of the more vulnerable segments of black urban society. (159)
Inside Southern Rhodesia, mangoromera was dominated by the Korekore who
acted as the 'agents of the Northern Natives who bring down the medicine
from time to time1. After delivery, it was fed into a distribution network
organised around well-known 'mangoromera chiefs or champions' who lived
in or near large towns and mines, and who were 'given a wide berth by the
Native Police1. It was not, however, a medicine which was freely available
to all; 'a person desirous of having Mangoromera can only be introduced
to a practitioner through one who has already been treated otherwise sus-
picions are aroused'. With admission to the circle thus controlled and
restricted, and with its distribution in the hands of the Korekore, mangoro-
mera seems to have been almost exclusively a Shona monopoly. This latter
feature, together with the effects of the treatment - 'bullying, assaults,
bravado and insubordination and the Natives having exaggerated opinions of
themselves1 (160) was to have considerable bearing on the events in
Bulawayo at the end of 1929.
VII
What emerges clearly from the details contained in the previous four sections
of this paper is that Bulawayo's black urban population at the end of the
1920s was reeling under a series of blows, some old, some new, of unprece-
dented severity. Through exploration of linkages between these various
factors and consideration of their interaction, it becomes possible to
reconstruct the probable course of events between December 1929 and January
1930, and to establish who the fighting was between, when and why. In
turn, this will reveal how the nature of the conflict changed significantly
even while the fighting was in progress.
The first factors which need to be knitted together are the influx of
foreign (largely Shona) work seekers to Bulawayo in the late 1920s and,
in the same period the lack of 'close scrutiny' exercised over the Location's
population. In all likelihood, these two factors combined to produce a
distinctive concentration of foreign migrants in the Location. Because any-
one could enter the Location, which in anycase was unfenced, and because un-
like the only other major centres of black urban housing, the railway
compounds, its accommodation was not tied to any particular type of employ-
ment, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Location was a haven for
unemployed newcomers. A parallel and not totally unrelated development at
a time of increasing unemployment, was the growth of a sizeable 'number of
undesirable persons' in the Location. In short, the Location was becoming
something of a refuge for thieves and, said the C.I.D, was characterised by
'habitual gambling and prostitution'1.(161)
Prostitution, as earlier discussed was itself merely one symptom of poverty
and insecurity in the Location, where the Municipality systematically mis-
used beerhall funds and enforced crippling rentals; where inhabitants were
harassed by frequent police raids; and where for most of the 1920s the
Location Superintendent and several of his 'police' were thoroughly corrupt.
Nor did the arrest and subsequent conviction of Vawdrey shortly before the
- 25 -
fighting began, do much to improve the lot of Location dwellers. Carbutt
was bluntly critical of the calibre of Vawdrey's successor, and many of the
Location evils complained of by the Chief Superintendent of the C.I.D.
referred to the period both before and after Vawdrey's successor took
office1. (162)
The very fact that many of these developments had roots tracing back
several years means that on their own none of them provide sufficient answer
to the question why the fighting occurred in 1929, and why in December?
The second part of the problem is easiest to explain. A glance at the
opening pages of this paper show that almost without exception 'faction
fights1 took place at the end. of the year. There were convincing reasons
for this. The devices of control discussed in preceding sections worked
well enough at 'normal1 times, even during the corrupt Vawdrey regime, but
were less effective over Christmas and New Year. Even in the tightly-
controlled mining industry where these controls operated for most of the
year, the situation was qualitatively different during the festive season
in general and on Christmas Day in particular. At that time more black
workers were simultaneously off duty than at any other time of the year;
'management and its agents, if not less vigilant, were likely to be slightly
more tolerant, and in terms of the invading ideology of Christianity the
workers did have a reason to celebrate. The brakes of control were thus
more difficult to apply'. (163)
But although the various elements in the Bulawayo Location were thus rendered
potentially more explosive over the festive season, there was nothing
initially to differentiate Christmas 1929 from any other. Such violence as
there was, was considered by the authorities to be unexceptional. The first
indications of a new development came on the morning of 27 December when
Ndebele delegations complained to Carbutt about Shona assaults, the par-
ticular significance of which necessitate detailed explanation.
Thus far we have written generally of Bulawayo1s black working class and of
its black urban population, sometimes employing the two terms almost inter-
changeably. While much of the evidence does not in fact permit any greater
analytical rigour, it is clear that the two were not necessarily the same
thing. Broadly speaking, three classes-in-formation were identifiable in
the black urban population of this period. There was the tiny African
petty-bourgeoisie (164) comprising small traders, businessmen and school-
teachers; the working class, which was probably the largest group; and
lastly a rapidly expanding 'under-class' where the unemployed merged, for
shorter or longer periods, with the Location's lumpenproletariat. Indeed,
this 'undesirable' group was sufficiently large and active to make life
even more unpleasant than it already was for what the authorities called
the 'respectable type of native'. 'Decent natives', explained the Chief
Superintendent of the C.I.D., 'are precluded from living comfortably in
the Location by the number of undesirable persons there ... Pilfering ...
is very rife (and) loafers steal from the town and Location and cannot be
caught'. (165) And because the Shona were the most recent migrants, many
of them would have occupied, at least temporarily, the lowest of Bulawayo's
socio-economic rungs, including the ranks of the petty criminals and the
unemployed. (166)
In the light of this, it is significant that the first outbreak of trouble
followed the socio-economic cleavages outlined above, and not purely
'tribal' divisions. Carbutt's report of 27 December 1929 remarked simply
that !there is no doubt that the better class of native residing in the
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Location is very apprehensive of trouble1. (167) Nor did the trouble
emanate from all Shona. Carbutt was told that 'natives from Victoria
circle (district) are at the bottom of it1, and that they
'go about in gangs of five or six: that they do
not allow any native to pass them and that they are
particularly dangerous at night ... natives who
have worked in Johannesburg are largely to blame for
the state of apprehension .., particularly ... the
type of native youth who ... "wear short coats and
trousers wide enough for a man to get inside".
(There was also) ... the insolent bearing of this
type in the streets, who stand in front of shop-
windows and block the foot ways'. (168)
The Victoria district, relatively heavily populated and with its best land
speedily alienated to whites, had been one of the first rural areas to be
underdeveloped. Consequently, the process of proletarianization had been
set in motion earlier and more thoroughly than almost anywhere else in
Southern Rhodesia. (169) Many of the region's inhabitants had experience
of working on the Rand and in Johannesburg, (170) where they would have
had first hand experience of the gangs specifically mentioned by Ndebele
complainants at the Location meeting on .the afternoon of 28 December:'
'other speakers said they were merely defending themselves against the
Mashona: that it was unsafe for any man to walk abroad at night, for fear
of being set upon by bands _ of Mashonas who they said would develop into
gangs similar to the "Zigebengu" and "Amalieta" gangs of Johannesburg,
unless they were suppressed1. (171) Complainants had reason enough to be
'apprehensive1; the night before the meeting, one of the people killed in
the Location had been executed in a manner which, although puzzling to the
local police, displayed all the skill and economy of a typical Rand gang
murder. As the body exhibited no signs of violence, it was only when a
post mortem was conducted that it was discovered that the victim had been
'struck over the heart just when that organ was in such a position, that
the blow - a comparatively light one - sufficed to split the apex of the
heart, internal bleeding setting in1. (172)
Moreover, not only did gang members wear fashionable and distinctive clothing
(Oxford bags 'wide enough for a man to get inside1), (173) but their
'insolent' and 'aggressive' behaviour was strongly suggestive of the
presence of mangoromera. The leader of these 'aggressive'Shona, according
to Carbutt's informants, was a man named 'Rusere alias James Mabala, a
native of Chibi District1, near Fort Victoria. (174) This man, who was
subsequently arrested and fined £10 or three months, (175) was identified
a few years later as an important mangoromera chief or ishe who 'plies his
sale of mangoromera medicines between Gwelo and Bulawayo'. (176) As a
known seller of mangororaera, which the Native Department was later told
had 'played quite an important role in the Mashona-Matabele clash at
Bulawayo1, (177) Mabala enjoyed a close relationship with his customers,
who would have been predominantly young, fairly new to Bulawayo, perhaps
unemployed, and Shona.
Very probably, then, the initial violence between Christmas Eve and 27
December, and in some instances afterwards, took the form of gang assaults
and robbery. It was these assaults which caused the more 'respectable1
Location residents to be apprehensive and to complain to the Native
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Department. For many of Bulawayo's longer-established black residents - a
division incorporating the 'respectable' element - this latest burden must
have been the last straw against a background of declining living standards
and intensifying job competition. With their wages depressed and their jobs
threatened by the influx of foreign migrants, the welling resentment of the
majority of Bulawayo's black population was given a convenient and not wholly
inappropriate focus by the violent actions of 'Shona' gangs in the period up
until 27 December.
At this point, any number of incidents, especially given the relaxation of
such controls as there were over Christmas, could have sparked the fighting.
A 'friendly' boxing match may have developed along the hypothetical lines
suggested by Carbutt: it turns 'into a serious fight, and gradually tribal
partisanship develops accompanied by insulting remarks and exaggeration.
Old tribal differences are raked up, and the inevitable rivalry for the favours
of women is brought in: feeling begins to run high and more lethal weapons
than fists are used'. (178) Alternatively, trouble may have begun over
foreigners abusing Ndebele women. For example, not long before the fighting
erupted, an Ndebele prostitute was badly beaten up by an 'alien' man in
provocative and public circumstances. (179) Or, lastly a peculiarly crass
form of provocation was probably delivered during the popular pastime of
gambling: 'mangoromera and gambling go hand in hand. A Mangoromera Native
would think nothing of picking up and walking away with the stakes. He
cannot be reported for theft and no-one cares to beat up the arrogant bully'. (180)
The Ndebele reaction was natural enough; 'every now and then, when they are
full of beer, the Matabele say, "Why are these people here? We do not go to
their country and molest them and take their jobs and wives. Let us drive
them out1". (181)
From the afternoon of 27 December, the nature of the conflict changed radically.
Whereas formerly it had essentially been a case of "Shona" gangs assaulting
workers, it now became a case of workers attacking" recent migrants, which
explains why the Location, home of most new migrants, was the subject of
persistent attacks. Once again, it was not an instance of mindless ethnic
animosity; throughout the fighting the Ndebele were joined by the so-called
'northern natives', themselves migrants, but of far longer, standing than the
recent influx of Shona, by whom they felt equally as threatened as did the
Ndebele. It was, for instance, people of 'mixed tribes' who burned Shona
possessions in No. 2 railway compound, (182) and when Carbutt eventually
managed to return the Shona labourers expelled almost a week before from the
same compound, his warning was directed to a crowd who were fall Northern
natives'. (183)
That the conflict was now fundamentally one between 'established' workers and
new immigrants, and not motivated by age-old 'tribal rivalries', was made
absolutely clear by several references to the recent nature of the animosity
felt towards the Shona. The Native Commissioner for Mzingwane discovered
that the 'trouble between the Matabele and Mashona originated in Bulawayo about
a year ago', (184) while a speaker at the final Location meeting on 4
January drew attention to new migrants: *I have been here for many years and
I have never known of trouble like this before. I do not know these new
Manyikas. I could pick out from among you here, some Manyikas I know since
1908'. (185) This is not to deny, of course, that once the fighting was in
progress all Shona became legitimate targets in an atmosphere replete with
inflammatory rumours. The corruption and favouritism which for so long had
characf.erised the Location management ensured that many Ndebele believed the
rumour that in return for £8, the Native Department had granted the Shona
permission to attack them. (186)
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Although the great bulk of the fighting involved workers against workers, the
breakdown" of order also allowed other scores to be settled, and opened up,
however fleetingly, more challenging vistas. One score was against the
Municipality, whose sudden decision towards the end of 1929 to take over all
Location housing, plus the fact that in the past its compensation had proved
unsatisfactory, were two factors which help explain the otherwise apparently
random damage to buildings in the Location on the night of 27 December. On
that occasion 'a number of huts were completely destroyed and between 200
and 300 windows and doors were smashed in'. (187) Far more ominous from the
State's point of view was the realisation by some workers where the real
source of their exploitation and oppression lay; during the mounted police
dispersal of the crowd on the Forestvale Road on the afternoon of the 27th,
'some of the more daring of the natives were heard shouting to their fellows:
"Come on, attack them, they are not armed" ' .(188) And later the same night,
at the height of the fighting in the Location, the Acting Location Superintendent
and another white Location official were stoned, 'but beyond minor bruises
were not injured1. (189)
VIII
Of paramount importance was the fact that the Bulawayo violence occurred
within, and at every stage was shaped by, the colonial nature of the Southern
Rhodesian social formation. As such, the fighting in the most general sense
can be interpreted in Fanonesque terms as internalised or displaced aggression. (190)
A more precise instrument of analysis, though, is the not incompatible concept
that violence of this sort was profoundly influenced by the process of class
suppression. Class suppresssion, explains Webster, 'implies two things:
firstly that consciousness of class - the common awareness of a shared interest -
is inhibited by ethnicity and race prejudice... (themselves) the result of
the deliberate manipulation of racial feelings by a group, usually the dominant
group... (and/or) as the result of a belief system developing a force independ-
ent of material interests in the narrow sense'. The second implication of
class suppression is 'the idea that the emergence of a class is "stunted"
through restrictions on its ability to organise or promote its collective
interests'. (191)
Appreciation of this latter aspect, the incomplete nature of class formation,
is especially helpful in confronting those features of the fighting which
are not easily reducible to class conflict. Indeed, as a society in transition
towards capitalist industrialization, Bulawayo's black population exhibited
many of the characteristics of what George Rude has termed the 'pre-industrial
crowd1. In 18th and early early 19th century Britain and France, the
'distinctive hall-marks' of the pre-industrial crowd were 'the prevalence
of the rural food riot, the resort to "direct action" and violence to property;
its "spontaneity"; its leadership from "without" the crowd; its mixed
composition... and its concern for the restoration of "lost" rights'. (192)
Clearly, certain of these hall-marks were missing from the Bulawayo 'faction
fight1. It was not a food riot, and with the exception of James Mabala, •
nothing is known about its leadership. What is compelling, though, is that
wherever the leaders did come from, it was not apparently from existing
organisations. This may be explained by the very conditions inside the Location
and compounds which precluded the emergence of distinct divisions among the
black population, but which were a source of considerable grievance to the
aspirant petty-bourgeoisie who, as on other occasions found a champion of
sorts in the ICU. (193) In 1928, Carbutt informed his superiors that the
ICU leaders desired that the 'residential quarter of the.... Location should
be divided, so that there should be an exclusive quarter for the educated
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people, who should not be expected to live in proximity to the barbarians;
in fact they recognise, and desire us to recognise, class distinctions
amongst their own people1. (194) If this attitude persisted, it would
explain why the rioters completely by-passed the established leadership of
the ICU, the Matabele Home Society and other organisations, leaving Masoja,
the General Secretary of the ICU, to admit publicly that 'we do not know
the head or start of it' (the fighting). (195) All the established leaders
could do was relay the stream of warning and threats from Carbutt to Location
residents. These two features aside, however, all of the other pre-industrial
characteristics mentioned by Rude were strongly in evidence during the dis-
turbances; direct action and violence to property were pronounced, as were
spontaneity and the mixed composition of the crowd. And in one sense, too,
the fighting was obviously concerned with the restoration of 'lost rights',
particularly in the labour market and over women. (196)
But these strong pre-industrial overtones notwithstanding, the Bulawayo
'faction fight' of December 1929 was first and foremost a manifestation of
intra-working class conflict. As this essay has demonstrated, the fighting,
at least from 27 December onwards, was very largely an expression of com-
petition within the working class about limited job opportunities. This
does not deny the undoubted existence of tribal ideology and sentiment, both
of which tended to obscure the real basis of the conflict. Although the
fighting had nothing to do with mindless, irrational 'tribal' violence, its
situation in the ghetto, where Bulawayo's black classes were squeezed to-
gether, did act as powerful insurance against the emergence of unsullied
class consciousness. In this respect, Mafeje's preliminary identification of
colonial administrators and the preoccupations of anthropologists as the twin
creators of 'tribalism' remains incomplete; to their activities should be
added the vital role of the urban ghetto in determining 'the material as
well as the ideological base of what is now called "tribalism"'. (197)
These conclusions, although based on very detailed examination of only one
'fight', are directly relevant to 'faction fights1 and tribalism in general.
Only when the meaning of race or tribalism is related fto the political
economy in order to demonstrate its entanglement with the social structure
through the process of class formation and class suppression mediated through
the differential incorporation of groups' (198) will understanding of these
concepts significantly advance beyond opinions such as that of the Rhodesia
Chamber of Mines who argued that 'faction fights' were 'riots which break out
for no apparent reason amongst savage people', (199) and that of a Legislative
Assembly member who considered that 'tribal fights are inevitable. In fact,
I think the natives rather enjoy these incidents'. (200)
I.R. Phimister and C. van Onselen
June 1978.
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